This Is Not The Same Bond Market That Existed Before 1995
Permalink Posted on 10-08-2006 at 05:52:21 pm by Aaron Email , 1856 words, 1238 views  

While pouring over Treasury International Capital (TIC) and Federal Funds Rate data recently, I found something that seems quite puzzling when one looks at foreign purchases of US corporate and Treasury securities, juxtaposted with the Federal Funds rate. The chart of these series seems to exhibit a striking change in relationship around 1995--most notably, the response of official purchases of Treasury securities to the Federal Funds Rate seems to have inverted:


(click for larger version. Note--labels on Funds rate are not negatives.)

This apparent inversion of market behavior is quite distinct, and in my humble opinion, demands explanation. One might ask whether Fed policy is what changed, or whether the market response to Fed policy (in terms of the Funds Rate) changed.

If it is the former, then in a sense one is arguing that the Fed funds rate is "reactive" and attempts to keep bond buying at a stable level (quelling excess bond buying, and stimulating low bond buying). Then the "1995" policy change would be that the Fed decided to reverse this, inflating high levels of bond buying even further, and crashing them when they were already low.

I consider this unlikely, because I don't think the Fed would intentionally try to create bubbles and boom-and-bust cycles (particularly for government income, as the case would be here). Further, I doubt the Fed is reactive towards bond purchase levels, using it as any sort of benchmark.

I think it is more likely that the market itself is reacting differently towards the Fed (with the Fed Funds Rate the independent variable), though not because of any inherent change in the market itself--rather, because of a seemingly-unrelated change in how the Fed operates.

That change is "transparency".

The transparency policy was introduced in the 1994-1996 timeframe, precisely when the bond market seems to have undergone this behavior inversion. Under the transparency policy, the Fed would issue statements with its regular board of governors meetings, summarizing the Fed's current thinking about the trajectory of the economy, as well as its plans for moves in terms of interest rates (and potentially other controls available to it, though I don't think the Fed has ever widely acknowledged any of them, most notably the reserve ratio).

This policy has been the modus operandi of the Fed ever since. While it has been hailed as a veritable "capitalist glasnost," I think there is a distinct dark side to the policy, as evidenced by the market's inversion. I think the inversion can be traced to a fundamental behavioral change in bond market participants in the presence of "transparency" of the type the Fed practices.

Imagine you are a bond buyer, pre-Fed-transparency. You have little inkling of what the Fed is going to do regarding interest rates at any given time; certainly one can make educated guesses based on macroeconomic indicators, but there never seems to be agreement on the implications of those, even amongst "experts." So for all intents and purposes, the Fed's proximate actions regarding interest rates are an unknown; and even those who think they do know will face just as many market participants who think they know the opposite, thus causing their relative influence to wash out.

So the overall behavior of bond buying upon a rate change will be very simple and intuitive: when the Fed raises interest rates, bond buying will increase, because bonds have become a more attractive asset (higher return, or yield). When the Fed lowers interest rates, bond buying will decrease, because bonds will have an inferior return. Simple.

It is important to note that in this world, Fed interest rate changes are "in the void"; they don't conclusively change one's information about the trajectory of the Fed's next move. Future moves are, in fact, almost a non-factor. Everyone may have their guesses, but no "signal" would emerge from the noise of the market.

Well, that would have all changed with the dawning of the transparency policy. Suddenly, the Fed is not only telling you what the current interest rate is, but it is telling you what the next interest rate will probably be. In fact, we can go one better: the Fed is telling you the trajectory of interest rates over the whole "near future" timespan.

Now what is a market participant going to do?

Well, when interest rates rise in an upward trajectory, people will sell bonds, overall. Why? Because in the near future, they know yields will be higher, making the bonds bought at the present time less valuable. It would be downright stupid to buy bonds during a rate increase cycle, unless the intent is to hold the bond until its expiration for a "risk-free", (relatively) low-yield return. But that kind of behavior does not predominate in bond market agents today.

When interest rates are in a down-trend, the opposite now occurs: since the yield on near-future bonds will be lower than the present yield, the value of present bonds will likely go up soon, leading to a tidy profit.

This behavior is the exact opposite of the behavior that would occur pre-transparency, and the critical element was simply to add information about the likely trajectory of the Fed interest rate series. Information is a powerful thing--particularly in markets.

I think there are also some deep ramifications of this bond-market transition for markets in general. By definition, inversion of bond-buying behavior implies that when interest rates are going up--a time normally strong for bonds--bonds would be predominantly getting sold off, as discussed. But this in turn suggests that during these times capital would in fact drain out of the bond market instead of in, and find its way into other financial instruments--most notably equities.

But if the goal in raising rates had been to slow the economy, this would obviously mark a failure in the sense that raising interest rates would now engender a stock market rally.

[And what do you know, that's just what we've seen over the past three years.]

On the flip side, lowering interest rates, which is supposed to stimulate the economy, would suck people disproportionately into the bond market, as they expect to profit purely from a trajectory of falling rates. This may also cause some diversion of funds into corporate debt, which could still act as some stimulus--think stock repurchases funded by borrowing.

The upshot is that raising rates would massively stimulate equities, and falling rates would perhaps still simulate them a lesser amount (through a more favorable corporate debnature environment). This would then amount to asymmetric stimulus emanating from the Fed, of the kind that always tends to inflate the private economy.

Consider, by the way, that "absolute" low interest rates are always attractive to debtors, so below some real lending cost threshold, private (and public?) debtors will take on essentially as much debt as they can get. If the inflation rate were to be lowballed, the situation would be even better for them. So I think there is not only some credence to arguments that the credit market behaves differently in the presence of "absolutely" low interest rates (as we have in today's era), but that this argument should be even stronger in times of very low real interest rates (which I think we also have today).

So it would appear the private securities market will always manage to get inflated in this regime. Indeed, in the above chart, one can see that corporate securities purchases seem little effected by interest rates post-1995; they always seem to go up (other than responding slightly to massive official moves in Treasury securities).

Adding to this point, the following chart showing net US securities purchases of all types by foreigners, could also be a consequence of this effect:



(click for larger version.)


Note the skyward launch immediately prior to 1995. Coincidence? I'm not so sure. There has been no regime in our history in which such an extreme event occurred, and we have glaring changes in liquidity policy and now, apparently, changes in the bond market's behavior right at that point.

Thus, I suspect that the transparency policy--which seems like a good, honest, innocent idea--actually has disastrous asset-inflationary effects when applied to the kind of liquidity-based central management the Fed performs. The policy may need to be reconsidered.

Or maybe the Fed should be reconsidered.

One other point about the new behavior. Above I discussed what happens during rising or falling Funds Rate trajectories. What of intervals of a flat Funds Rate? If I am right about the fundamentals, then a flat Funds Rate interval would be biased towards the stock market, as opportunities to time-arbitrage US Treasury Securities would vanish, and speculative money would likely pour into the stock market in pursuit of higher returns. Due to the herd buying effect, these returns would likely come very quickly, providing "instant gratification" for many. Simultaneously, bonds would initially "crash," but then likely rebound a bit and stabilize, as "neutral" bond buying behavior takes over. The data appears to support this thesis (as does the recent unfolding of events).

Also, allow me to attempt to head off potential rejoinders that the bond market (and to some extent the other markets) will be controlled predominantly by inflation/recession fundamentals. One of the great victories of the Fed of the past decade seems to be having convinced everyone that, as far as financial decisions go, there is no inflation (and there won't be in the future). Everyone is well aware of the fact that general prices are still going up (and even accelerating), but somehow this notion has been severed from the financial notion of inflation. Its like people live two lives--a real economy life and a financial economy life, with the latter floating off in la-la land. Further, you have a large fraction of bond (and other) market particpants acting as intermediary investors, which means they don't have to live off of the real level of investment returns. Thus I am not sure it is very accurate to model the behavior of participants in the market--especially the bond market--as containing an "inflation expectations" component.

Finally, everyone seems to have become "recession blind", with the Fed claiming that landings will always be "soft" (recession-free) and the entire cadre of "expert" punditry never seeing a recession until after it arrives (i.e. most economists fail to see recessions coming).

In the midst of all this confusion and misinformation about recession, inflation, and their influence on the financial markets, it would seem to me that any clear signal the Fed gives about near-term interest rate behavior would overwhelmingly dominate the behavior of bond market participants.

The above analysis only a beggining; there are certainly more glaring questions. Why do these effects seem to hold even though foreign official (central bank) purchasing shouldn't be convertible between public and private securities? Does the effect hold for domestic purchasers of bonds and stocks? How far back does the pattern hold? What is the influence of inflation (both CPI and a "real" inflation rate based on M1)? Perhaps some of you can help answer these questions.

Comments, Pingbacks:

Comment from: Steve Waldman [Visitor] Email · http://www.interfluidity.com/
Aaron, This is a long and fairly difficult piece. Here are a few probably quite confused comments:

I guess my first question would be about how transparent post-1995 Fed transparency is, compared to the opacity that prevailed before. It's certainly true that all the statements and minutes and whatnot have spawned a whole industry of high-pay, low-productivity Kremlinologists (just when we thought we had won the Cold War). But your claim is that post-1995, people could telegraph a single rate move to multiple moves, where previously they could not. But looking at the Federal Funds rate over time, it has always been a "trending series", moving up in multiple steps or down in multiple steps. Changes in Federal Funds have always been positive for a while, then negative for a while, and I don't think it took until 1995 for people to notice this. I'm uncertain there's very much additional information in all the Fed-speak when a move has just begun. To the degree that there might be some use to the Kremlinology, Fed comments might help to predict the timing of changes -- when hikes become a pause, when a pause becomes a cut or a raise or whatever.

I'm with you in questioning the whole transparency thing. A neoclassical, Ricardian, rational expectations kind of view suggests that if central banks can influence the real economy at all, they can only do so by violating people's expectations. It has become fashionable to say that all this is wrong, that even well anticipated CB policy has effects. I'm sure that's true. But I'm also sure the element of surprise counts for something. Sometimes I think all the Fed speak is really an anti-transparency measure, a means by which they can fake-out participants in order to really make a splash when they want to. Or a means by which they can influence markets without having to actually do anything at all. In any case, I'm very critical of central banks as institutions, and would rather we improve market institutions so we can do away with this "island of central planning within this market economy" (as Brad DeLong has put it). But, if we're going to have central banks, and we want them to be effective at controlling inflation and tweaking output, I just don't understand the transparency fetish. I think the whole thing is just a way of deflecting charges of cronyinsm and corruption that are mostly merited.

But, back to your argument. I think you are very right to notice a "conundrum" in the fact that when the Fed raises, stocks often go up. But market participants expecting future rate hikes increases rather than resolves my puzzlement at this behavior. If the Fed is going to raise for a long period of time, that means the discount rate by which all assets are valued should rise significantly. Both stocks and bonds ought to be hit by a foreseeably appreciating discount rate. As you suggest, bondholders who see the writing on the wall should bail early, forcing long rates high as soon as the Fed begins to hike. But prices adjust at the margin, not with all the money. If the market really knows that rates will climb across the yield curve, then prices should adjust immediately, forcing most bondholders to accept unrealized losses, before they have a chance to revv up the stockmarket. Then the stock market should fall, as nervous stockholders at the margin decides that high, certain yields are preferable to risky equity positions.

Of course, none of this has happened in the recent past. Bondholders mostly have not sold off, despite Fed rate hikes. They've kept bonds expensive, and let the yield curve invert. And stocks, as you note, seem to have rallied on the hikes and on the pause. I think that the most parsimonious explanation for all this is something "exogenous" to the Fed and the markets -- lots of new money seeking US securities generally, sustaining high prices for all asset classes, whatever the Fed does on the short side of the curve. In this era when all the world hangs on how Ben Bernanke wipes his face at a fancy dinner, I don't know that there's ever been a period where Fed policy has seemed more irrelevant to market behavior than this tightening cycle.

Anyway, I see this external capital as explaining much of what you observe: Official purchases of Treasuries have risen when US short rates are low, because foreign central banks buy them to defend the dollar, which would otherwise fall as investors flee flow interest rates. Official purchases have fallen when short rates rise, because the USD becomes more attractive to private investors, so export-focused countries don't have to work to keep the USD high relative to their currencies. Through the waxes and wanings, foreign central banks have been huge net purchasers of all kinds of US debt, helping to explain the monotonic rise in foreign purchases. (So long as the US current account deficit grows, purchases of US assets by foreigners must grow in very close to the same quantity.)

I agree with you in your skepticism of the bond market's ability to enforce an inflation premium. Obviously, purchasers of bonds would like to earn yields higher than the inflation they face. They'd also like to earn yields of a zillion percent. But sellers don't want to give them that. There have been lots of times in the past, and I expect there will be a time sometime soon, when those who want to save liquid wealth into the future have to pay for the privilege in real terms, rather than being paid for it. Nominal interest rates have a zero lower bound, but real interest rates can and do go negative, textbook "inflation premiums" in bond prices notwithstanding.

Blah blah blah blah blah. Though I don't entirely agree with this one, your pieces are always very thought-provoking. Sorry for the logorrhea, and I look forward to more!
PermalinkPermalink 10-09-2006 @ 21:48
Comment from: Aaron [Member] Email
I'll have to read your response more closely tommorrow, but let me say two things in brief:

1) I agree you have found the biggest flaw in my thesis here: Fed rate moves have always been "telescoping", so why would transparency make the difference in apparent foreknowledge? I haven't come up with a good answer to this yet.

2) I dont think the "defend the dollar" thesis pans out. One problem is that this thesis would require that the current-era bond market behavior by foreigners is the same as in the pre-1995 era, which it isn't (the point of the piece, of course). Secondly, even post-1995, the data regarding dollar value doesn't make sense: the dollar rose from 1997 to 2002, at which point it peaked, and has been falling almost continuously since. Thus the dollar value trends seem to span bond/securities buying *and* selling trends in an uncorrelated way.

Addressing the behavior of the dollar directly for a minute, I think it went up in large part due to a combination of "safe haven" behavior post-Asian financial crises, as well as general US financial bubble. I think it began declining in 2002 simply through exhaustion.

Other than that, the whole damn thing is really mysterious, since it coincides with what (at first blush, at least) appear to be *low* interest rates. Perhaps a real-interest-rate analysis will be more enlightening.

In any case, the dollar's behavior would be somewhat "higher-level" of a phenomenon than the particular balance of buying between the bond and equities markets, and how the Fed funds rate bears on them.
PermalinkPermalink 10-10-2006 @ 00:13
Comment from: Steve Waldman [Visitor] Email · http://www.interfluidity.com/
I think the "defend the dollar" thesis needs to be stated more precisely to be coherent. It's not a statement about, say the European Central Bank, but about the People's Bank of China, the Bank of Japan, and the central banks of other export-reliant Asian countries. Under this thesis, a "change of behavior" date would be 1997-8, rather than 1995, but I think that's plausible in your chart. The "broad dollar" or "USD/EUR" don't much matter, it's the USD/CNY (and USD/JPY) that has been kept artificially strong. The USD/CNY has hardly varied at all, but China's purchases of dollar securities may well have. It's also worth noting that the dollar has been "defended" with respect to the currencies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc. All these currencies are pegged, and all these "export superpowers" (manufacturing superpowers in Asia, oil superpowers in the Gulf) have been driving up bond prices in the most direct way possible, by relentlessly purchasing.

Of course, it hasn't been a one-way bull market. 10 year yields rose from lows below 4 to a peak of ~5.5, I think. But relative to other Fed tightening cycles, it's been a remarkably benign bond market. (Stocks have done okay too.)

I've got to watch myself with this stuff, because it's become like a fable to me, how the leopard got its spots, how export-subsidizing central banks are sending us cheap money to buy cheap goods, and how we take that stuff like good smack. I fear I'm a bit, er, autoDogmatic about it! I just can't think of another way of making sense of these topsy-turvy times... but maybe you can!
PermalinkPermalink 10-10-2006 @ 00:52
Comment from: Aaron [Member] Email
Ok, so I've re-read your post, and here's a chart that may help test at least one of your claims, regarding the "trending series" nature of the Federal Funds Rate:

chart on fed funds

Now, this is the *effective* rate (i.e. the one actually achieved), as distinct from the *target* rate. But it pretty clearly shows what the target is, modulo some noise.

The immediate thing to notice about this data is that you are right in pointing out that the Funds series trended consistently prior to 1995, but that pattern does not extend completely back in time. The Funds Rate series, in fact, seems quite volatile before 1987, the obvious conclusion of which being that the "trending" policy is a brainchild of Greenspan.

Interesting.

But now we're left with perhaps more questions than we began with--such as why the inversion effect didn't happen in 1987, and how it could have happened instead on the 1995 boundary despite the qualitatively uniform nature of the underlying series.

So it seems "trending" cannot be the resolution to the conundrum. Trending may be a necessary, but not sufficient condition to explain the prediction of the Funds Rate by market participants.

Let me establish at this point that it is distinctly the case that the Fed had nothing akin to the transparency policy before 1994/5. In fact the Fed was quite secretive before then. So I submit that this is still a major factor for consideration.

The question then is how this policy change might be integrated, along with the newly-added transparency, to invert the market behavior.

I thought it might help to look at how market participants predict the Funds rate, so I looked this up. As you may know, there is a Federal Funds Rate futures contract on the CBOT, which is the key instrument for formally doing this prediction.

Interestingly, this market device has existed since 1988! This coincides well with the Greenspan era and the relatively calmer Funds Rate series, but it still fails to explain why 1995 is a behavioral transition point--could market participants have been so stupid prior to 1995 that they couldn't "read the writing on the wall" (i.e. past Fed moves) to determine the future moves?

It seems unlikely.

The following paper may at least help to address these questions as it examines the predicative power of the Funds Rate futures market:

http://br.endernet.org/~akrowne/econ/papers/funds_futures.pdf

It is interesting to note that the spread between the prediction and the actual target rate did indeed get noticeably better (smaller) in 1994/5. The natural question would be: is this relatively modest effect really responsible for such a dramatic sea change in the market's behavior around then? Somehow I doubt it!

Again, perhaps a necessary, but not sufficient condition. Or perhaps an effect, not a cause. So again, more questions remain.

The authors of this paper do point out (in a footnote) that translating the Funds Rate futures number into an actual prediction is very difficult. While one can infer a probability from the contract, one cannot tell precisely when the rate change will happen, or to what extent. What you really have is a product of likelihood and magnitude, and some vague notion of "near future." Was this ambiguity such a bulwark to bond speculation that Fed Minutes (and their concomitant Kremlinologists) completely changed the game?

I dont know, but I do think it is possible.

There was also a change in 94-95, I believe, whereby the Treasury mechanized the bond purchasing system, which may have factored into making the market more liquid and short-term speculative. Perhaps this was the trigger that turned all those "necessary but not sufficient" factors into real drivers of the market.

Anyway, I'll conclude by taking stock of things that didn't happen in 1994/1995, and those that did:

Things that didn't happen or change in 1995:

- Asian currency crisis
- Fed chief change
- Fed Funds Rate volatility/consistency
- The availability of a Fed Funds Rate Futures market
- Hedge funds become a major influence

Things that did happen:

- Transparency policy introduced
- Bond market mechanized
- Japan goes to ZIRP; Yen carry trade is born.
- M3 launches skyward

Please let me know if you can think of things that are missing from this list.

At this point I remain very unsettled: the bond market (or at least a major portion of it) is not behaving the way it historically has (as the bahvior has inverted), and no one seems to have (a) noticed or (b) cared.

Not only do I want to really know what the Fed is doing and what its influence truly is, but I want to be able to (broadly) anticipate what the market is going to do! This seems important to me.

How can anyone profess to know anything about finance and macroeconomics if they don't even know what interest rates will do to stock vs. bond buying, and the influx of capital to the country?

Certainly, if we can't resolve the question here and now, I'll keep it on the backburner =)
PermalinkPermalink 10-10-2006 @ 17:05
Comment from: Steve Waldman [Visitor] Email · http://www.interfluidity.com/
Aaron,

I spent a little bit of time playing around with graphs of the Federal Funds Rate this morning, and I agree with you. There was a qualitative change in behavior, beginning to my eyes around July, 1987. (Only after deciding this did I check, and -- surprise, surprise -- Greenspan's term began August, 1987.) Although the series has always been trending in the sense that it would rise for some period and then fall for some period (unlike, say, asset returns that jump fairly randomly between rising and falling), it is much more well-behaved post-1987, staying positive or unchange for longer periods, then staying negative or unchanged for longer periods, than it had previously. It does look more, er, transparent and predictable.

I don't know how to explain a 1995 change in behavior from all this either. The things you've suggested are all interesting. It's also possible that behavior just changes with a lag, that it just took some time for bond market participants to "learn" the Greenspan Fed, and once they some critical mass began to, a "tipping point" effect translated into a broader change of behavior. But these are just wild speculations.

In your original graph, I don't see a 1995 change of behavior as clearly as you do. Eying things, I see some correlation between Federal Funds and Official Purchases from ~1991 thru ~1997, something of an inverse relationship thereafter, and no clear relationship before. I'm probably be missing something here.

I'm afraid I have very little capacity to resolve these sorts of questions, but I'll look for what comes off your back-burner! Markets seem to have defied many common-sensical and economic theoretical relationships between stocks, bonds, and interest rates in the recent past.
PermalinkPermalink 10-11-2006 @ 18:56
Comment from: Aaron [Member] Email
Thanks for delving deeper.

My working hypothesis now basically agrees with yours: there were many factors, not all of which happened precisely in 1994/5, but which culminated then.

Probably the transparency shift was the catalyst that, combined with more mechanized Treasury sales, a smoother underlying rate series, and money expansion, caused speculative buying to explode. This speculative buying had the character of nearly-deterministic time arbitrage, the emerging effect being still largely as I said originally: tending to have the opposite of the stimulus effect you would expect, and leaning towards always inflating the stock market.

There seems to me to remain a cognitive disjunct, whereby raising interest rates strengthens bonds over the very very short-term and this is what market observers and participants expect, but as part of a long-term trend, rate increases actually weaken the bond market (in favor of the stock market).

The opposite goes for rate decreases.

It is worth mentioning that a market-equilibrum based interest rate would not have these problems: you really don't know where its going to go, and it would likely not change much over short periods of time. It seems to me that things would be much more stable in such a world!
PermalinkPermalink 10-12-2006 @ 08:27
What changed in 1995? The G7 agreed on a course of coordinated dollar intervention in order to allow Japan to export its way out of recession.

Plaza Accord Redux

By John H. Makin
Posted: Saturday, January 1, 2000
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
AEI Online (Washington)
Publication Date: September 1, 1995

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.5399/pub_detail.asp
PermalinkPermalink 12-20-2006 @ 16:43

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